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CLIMATE CHANGE INSURANCE AND 
DISASTERS: IS THE SHENZHEN SOCIAL 




Abstract: As one of the most disaster-prone nations, China is grappling with 
creating effective adaptation strategies. In an effort to pool risk, Chinese offi-
cials are introducing new climate change insurance products. This Article de-
scribes one pilot product introduced in the City of Shenzhen, a global mega-
city with a population of approximately fifteen million, and explores its 
strengths and weaknesses as a model for adaptation to climate change. This 
Article concludes with proposals for reducing risk within mega-cities and 
pooling risk among them. 
INTRODUCTION 
Funded insurance policies play an important financial buffer role for 
national economies allowing communities to rebound from natural disas-
ters. For many countries, insurance claims have provided financing for 30–
40% of the existing disaster losses.1 These losses include both loss of hu-
man lives and property.2 So-called “advanced economies” fare better than 
“emerging economies” with 53% of the losses covered as compared to 6.6% 
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 1 Coco Liu, Millions of China’s Farmers Now Buy Climate-Change Insurance, CLIMATE 
WIRE, SCI. AM. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/millions-of-chinas-
farmers-now-buy-climate-change-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/K263-VS5D]. 
 2 Three Months After the Indian Ocean Earthquake-Tsunami Report, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/asia_tsunami/3months/report/en/ [https://perma.cc/N8C7-
57NX]. The 2004 tsunami that impacted Indonesia, Thailand, and other Southeast Asian states killed 
approximately 280,000 people and injured many more. Id. The 2010 floods in Pakistan impacted 
twenty million people and caused approximately $10 billion in damages. K. ALAN KRONSTADT ET 
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FLOODING IN PAKISTAN: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 
(2010), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41424.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N5Q-YNSR]. 
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of losses, respectively.3 Historically, most of the claims for losses associat-
ed with national disasters have been concentrated in North America, but this 
has been changing with large recent insurance losses in Asia, Oceania, and 
Latin America.4 Even with these geographical shifts in losses, the insurance 
market in Asia remains almost inconsequential.5 
Payments for natural disaster losses in the last few decades have been 
possible because companies, particularly reinsurance companies, have been 
able to spread disaster losses across time and across geographies.6 As the 
intensity and frequency of disasters are increasingly attributed in some part 
to climate change, insurance companies have taken a close look at the im-
pact of climate change on their policies.7 Less work has been done in de-
veloping new insurance approaches designed to address the aftermath of 
climate-change related losses particularly for mega-cities.8 Instead, insur-
                                                                                                                           
 3 CHARTERED INS. INST., SOCIAL VALUE OF INSURANCE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INSUR-
ANCE: NOT JUST COPING BUT HELPING . . . 2 (2015), http://www.cii.co.uk/media/6196029/svi-5_
climate_change_june2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZL9-GWCJ]. 
 4 Sebastian von Dahlen & Goetz von Peter, Natural Catastrophes and Global Reinsurance—
Exploring the Linkages, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2012, at 23, 25–26, http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_
qt1212e.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8LY-5937]. 
 5 See SIGMA, SWISS RE, NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND MAN-MADE DISASTERS IN 2014: 
CONVECTIVE AND WINTER STORMS GENERATE MOST LOSSES 7 tbl.3, 11–12 (2015), http://media.
swissre.com/documents/sigma2_2015_en_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/62VS-3JXA]. In 2014, 60% 
of economic losses from natural disasters in North America were recoverable under insurance in 
contrast to 10% of similar economic losses in Asia. Id. 
 6 See, e.g., International Locations, MUNICH RE, http://www.munichre.com/en/career/
munich-re-as-an-employer/corporate-structure/locations/index.html [https://perma.cc/7CLZ-FRP5] 
(noting that MunichRe has 5000 clients worldwide in North America, South America, Europe, 
Africa, Asia, and Australia). 
 7 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME 
EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 9 (2012), http://ipcc-
wg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-All_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJK9-RF6Z] (noting 
medium confidence that the increase in heavy precipitation has been caused by anthropogenic 
climate change); see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-285, CLIMATE CHANGE: 
FINANCIAL RISKS TO FEDERAL AND PRIVATE INSURERS IN COMING DECADES ARE POTENTIALLY 
SIGNIFICANT 5 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/257686.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM5N-MA72]. 
See generally Evan Mills, A Global Review of Insurance Industry Responses to Climate Change, 
34 GENEVA PAPERS 323, 359 (2009), http://evanmills.lbl.gov/pubs/pdf/gpp200914a.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HSS2-EZLU] (discussing the response of insurance companies to global climate change). 
 8 See Mongolia: Index Based Livestock Insurance Project, WORLD BANK (Sept. 24, 2009), 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2009/09/23/index-based-livestock-insurance-project 
[https://perma.cc/468B-A7EQ]. Innovative index insurance programs have been designed for 
specific producers in the Global South to alleviate losses associated with climate shifts including 
excessive rainfall, lengthy draughts, and large temperature fluctuations. Id.; see, e.g., Press Re-
lease, African Risk Capacity, Drought Triggers ARC Insurance Payout in Sahel Ahead of Human-
itarian Aid 1 (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.africanriskcapacity.org/documents/350251/844579/
PI_Press+Release+Sahel+Payouts+_EN_22012015_vFinal_CR.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KDL-LNRP] 
(demonstrating payouts from insurance companies to alleviate losses associated with climate shifts 
such as lengthy droughts). 
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ance companies have largely relied on existing products such as first-person 
health insurance or property insurance to cover losses from floods, fires, 
and heat waves. 
The insurance industry is understandably worried about its exposure to 
the weather; for instance, scholars observe that the probability of an ex-
treme meteorological event is rapidly changing.9 Climate scientists predict 
with a high level of confidence that human impacts on the quantity of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere have at least doubled the risk of severe 
heatwaves like the European heatwave of 2003 that resulted in the hottest 
summer since 1500 AD and several fatalities.10 Further, major tropical 
storms, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific region, have been increasing in 
duration and intensity by about fifty percent since the 1970s.11 
The insurance industry, particularly in the Global North, has reacted to 
these changes. In 2015, the Chartered Insurance Institute, a professional 
organization for the insurance industry, connected particular events to climate 
change triggers and announced $3.2 trillion of losses that it attributed to 
climate change.12 To evaluate the impacts of climate change on the insur-
ance industry, a number of the larger reinsurers including Munich Re and 
Swiss Re are maintaining a “climate change event database.”13 Unfortunate-
ly for policyholders, adjusting some of the traditional premium-driven 
mechanisms to respond to climate change risks has led to the cancellation of 
some policies and to expansive increases in premiums for other policies.14 
In 2014, Shenzhen, China began its large-scale experiment with a na-
tionally funded city-wide model of disaster insurance created as part of a 
larger national strategy of socio-economic adaptation, which should interest 
more than simply Chinese citizens.15 By 2050, the United Nations predicts 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Peter Hoeppe & Eugene N. Gurenko, Scientific and Economic Rationales for Innovative 
Climate Insurance Solutions, 6 CLIMATE POL’Y 621, 622 (2006). 
 10 See Peter A. Stott et al., Human Contribution to the European Heatwave of 2003, 432 NA-
TURE 610, 610 (2004). 
 11 See P.J. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity in a 
Warming Environment, 309 SCI. 1844, 1846 (2005). 
 12 CHARTERED INS. INST., supra note 3. 
 13 Id. 
 14 EVAN MILLS & EUGENE LECOMTE, CERES, FROM RISK TO OPPORTUNITY: HOW INSURERS 
CAN PROACTIVELY AND PROFITABLY MANAGE CLIMATE CHANGE 12 (2006), http://www.ceres.
org/resources/reports/how-insurers-can--manage-climate-change-2006 [https://perma.cc/89FT-
NDDP] (describing examples where insurance companies decided not to renew homeowners’ 
policies). 
 15 Susan Munro & Amy Wang, China Announces Policies to Accelerate Development of Chi-
nese Insurance Industry, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (July 15, 2014), http://www.steptoe.com/
publications-9727.html [https://perma.cc/WCE6-WUH3]. 
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that eighty percent of the world’s population will live in urban areas.16 In 
East Asia, the World Bank predicts that the urban population will double 
between 1994 and 2025.17 Cities are particularly vulnerable to climate 
change. As urbanization has increased rapidly in the last several decades 
leading to more individuals concentrated in urban areas, natural disaster 
impacts have become increasingly concentrated.18 For example, population 
density and a lack of construction regulations in Port au Prince, Haiti inten-
sified the impacts of the 2010 earthquake.19 The same trend towards global 
urbanization is also increasingly exposing new urban lands to climate 
threats because at least some of the lands are reclaimed lands that are at or 
just above sea level.20 For example, in the Netherlands the amount of urban 
area that may be flooded during an extreme weather event has increased six 
times in the twentieth century and is expected to continue to increase 
through this century.21 These impacts on cities will be costly; experts esti-
mate that if Boston fails to invest in climate-adaptive efforts, the city will 
suffer $57 billion of loss by 2100 with $26 billion of those losses attributed 
to climate change.22 Megacities in Asia with a population of more than five 
million people are particularly vulnerable because 65% of these megacities 
are located in “low elevation coastal zone” regions.23 
This Article queries whether a model of municipal social insurance 
will offer an effective adaptive response to the increasing threat of climate 
                                                                                                                           
 16 DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: 
THE 2011 REVISION 14 (2012), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/
pdf/urbanization/WUP2011_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/54XG-XLQR]. 
 17 See ABHAS K. JHA & HENRIKE BRECHT, WORLD BANK, AN EYE ON EAST ASIA AND PA-
CIFIC: BUILDING URBAN RESILIENCE IN EAST ASIA 2 (n.d.), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTEASTASIAPACIFIC/Resources/226262-1291126731435/EOEA_Abhas_Jha_April2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D5BK-KUSB]. 
 18 See DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, supra note 16 (noting that 54% of 
the world’s population currently lives in cities and projections indicate that 66% of the world’s 
population will be living in cities by 2050). 
 19 See Kathleen A. Tobin, Population Density and Housing in Port-au-Prince: Historical 
Construction of Vulnerability, 39 J. URB. HIST. 1045, 1054 (2013) (noting that approximately 30% 
of Haiti’s 9.8 million people lived in Port au Prince when the earthquake struck). 
 20 David Fogarty, Singapore Raises Sea Defences Against Tide of Climate Change, REUTERS 
(Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-climate-singapore-idUSLNE80Q00J20120127 
[https://perma.cc/T3GT-EB2M] (describing Singapore as a nation that has reclaimed land in order 
to expand its land area but is now faced with installing sea walls to prevent flooding from sea level 
rise). 
 21 Hans de Moel et al., Development of Flood Exposure in the Netherlands During the 20th 
and 21st Century, 21 GLOB. ENVTL. CHANGE 620, 624 (2011). 
 22 Alistair Hunt & Paul Watkiss, Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation in Cities: A Review 
of the Literature, 104 CLIMATIC CHANGE 13, 27 (2011). 
 23 Gordon McGranahan et al., The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of Climate Change and 
Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones, 19 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 17, 29 (2007). 
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change for urban centers. In this Article, adaptation is understood as refer-
ring to “the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its ef-
fects,” and in particular any action that “seeks to moderate harm or exploit 
beneficial opportunities.”24 Insurance is commonly understood as part of a 
broader adaptation strategy.25 It has also been embraced by the G-7 na-
tions—Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United 
States—as part of an international development agenda.26 Part I describes 
the social insurance pilot designed in Shenzhen, China.27 Part II reflects on 
whether insurance and particularly municipal social insurance like the 
Shenzhen model can provide adequate adaptation to the threats of climate 
change.28 Part III suggests that targeted subsidies for climate-proofing busi-
nesses and residences and global pooling of catastrophe risk among megaci-
ties will be necessary if insurance programs like the Shenzhen pilot are to 
be effective as an adaptation mechanism for climate change impacts.29 
I. CHINA’S DISASTER SOCIAL INSURANCE PILOT 
In 2014, China experienced losses of sixty-nine billion yuan, approxi-
mately $10 billion in U.S. dollars, due to natural disaster.30 China hosts 
large numbers of factories. especially in the Pearl River Delta Economic 
Zone region, where about 40% of the western side of the delta is two meters 
or less above sea level.31 Presently only about 10% of the total economic 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Christopher B. Field et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Poli-
cymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1, 5 (C.B. 
Field et al. eds., 2014), https://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2TPR-NXS6]. 
 25 Ian R. Noble et al., Adaptation Needs and Options, in id. at 845. 
 26 See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, G-7 Leaders’ Declaration (June 
8, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/08/g-7-leaders-declaration [https://
perma.cc/K37B-TS8Z] (calling for the G-7 States “to increase by up to 400 million the number of 
people in the most vulnerable developing countries who have access to direct or indirect insurance 
coverage against the negative impact of climate change related hazards by 2020 and support the 
development of early warning systems in the most vulnerable countries” and to “learn from and 
build on already existing risk insurance facilities such as the African Risk Capacity, the Caribbean 
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility and other efforts to develop insurance solutions and markets 
in vulnerable regions, including in small islands developing states, Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin 
America and the Caribbean”). 
 27 See infra notes 30–52 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 53–101 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 102–141 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Luo Bin, China Confirms Plan for Setting Disaster Insurance System, CRIENG-
LISH.COM (Oct. 17, 2014), http://english.cri.cn/12394/2014/10/17/3746s848346.htm [https://perma.
cc/8KQ3-6ZTE]. 
 31 KAI-UWE SCHANZ & SHAUN WANG, GENEVA ASS’N, INSURING FLOOD RISKS IN ASIA’S 
HIGH-GROWTH MARKETS: A GENEVA ASSOCIATION RESEARCH REPORT 35 (2015), http://www.
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losses in this region are insured against a hundred-year storm surge.32 Under 
current sea level predictions, unless there are substantial reductions in the 
production of greenhouse gases or an increase in coastal buffers, forty-one 
to sixty-three million people across China will be exposed to increased lev-
els of flood exposure.33 Insurers predict that even if current levels of flood 
probability can be maintained, hundred-year asset exposure losses in cities 
such as Guangzhou, with a population of 8.5 million people, could increase 
from around $39 billion to $500 billion by 2050.34 
In addition to Guangzhou, China is home to between three and five of 
the twenty global coastal cities most exposed to future flood losses, depend-
ing on whether one takes into account the proportion of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) lost to flooding.35 China’s national government understands 
its exposure to large-scale national disasters and has been strategically in-
vesting national resources to address the spreading of risk. Since the 1980s, 
the Chinese government has heavily subsidized crop catastrophe insurance 
and for the past decade the China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(“CIRC”) has been very supportive of rolling out more pilot programs to 
deliver general catastrophe insurance.36 The CIRC, along with the primary 
government ministries, is a key player in the disaster management system 
within China.37 
The Disaster Insurance Pilot in Shenzhen, also referred to in literature 
as the Catastrophe Insurance Framework, is the first experiment by the 
Government of China to spread risks associated with climate change events 
through catastrophe insurance at the municipal level.38 One of the global 
                                                                                                                           
iisonline.org/files/TC/PDF/ga2015-insuring-flood-risk-in-asias-high-growth-markets.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KM2F-C4DL]. 
 32 Id. at 9. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. at 9, 11. This prediction of a substantial increase in financial losses can be attributed 
in part to the large increases in Global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), especially in “emerging 
Asia,” where the GDP has increased from 6% in 2000 to 22% in 2013. Id. 
 35 See Stephane Hallegatte et al., Future Flood Losses in Major Coastal Cities, 3 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 802, 803 (2013), http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v3/n9/pdf/nclimate
1979.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM8H-A8FV]. Based on measuring just the economic average annual 
losses, China is home to the first (Guangzhou), ninth (Shenzhen), and twelfth (Tianjin) most risk 
exposed cities in the world, based on the level of risk in relation to percentage of GDP. Id. Based 
on measuring the level of economic average annual losses in relation to the percentage of GDP 
that may be lost, China is home to the first (Guangzhou), sixth (Zhanjiang), tenth (Shenzhen), 
eighteenth (Tianjin), and twentieth (Xiamen) most risk exposed cities in the world. Id. 
 36 See Meixian Song & Yiqing Yang, Introduction to Chinese Insurance Law, in INSURANCE 
LAW IN CHINA 9 (Johanna Hjalmarsson & Dingjing Huang eds., 2015). 
 37 See YI KANG, DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN CHINA IN A CHANGING ERA 41 (2015). 
 38 China: Shenzhen Launches Its First Disaster Insurance Pilot Scheme, ASIA INS. REV. (July 
17, 2014), http://www.asiainsurancereview.com/News/View-NewsLetter-Article/id/30681/Type/
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reinsurer leaders, Swiss Re, is offering technical assistance and reinsurance 
for the program.39 Shenzhen was selected for the pilot because it has major 
exposure to a variety of potential disaster threats, a large number of valua-
ble assets, and is experimenting with a carbon market to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions.40 With approximately fifteen million residents, the mega-city 
has a large amount of infrastructure, including an airport and railways, that 
are vulnerable to flooding, a phenomenon that has become increasingly fa-
miliar to Shenzhen residents in the past few years.41 The hope is that the 
pilot can be scaled up to address similar threats in the numerous other Chi-
nese coastal cities where assets are exposed.42 
This catastrophe insurance framework includes three different interact-
ing tiers of insurance. The first tier is the government catastrophe assistance 
insurance, which is bought by the Shenzhen municipal government to sup-
ply basic assistance to all residents.43 The government of the City of Shen-
zhen is purchasing its catastrophe insurance products from the People’s In-
surance Company of China’s (“PICC”) Shenzhen branch whose coverage is 
underwritten by Swiss Re, China Re, and Taiping Re.44 This insurance func-
tions as indemnity insurance: the insurance company will pay for actual 
                                                                                                                           
eDaily/China-Shenzhen-launches-its-first-disaster-insurance-pilot-scheme [https://perma.cc/W8FB-
TFC6]. 
 39 Swiss Re Works with Government Bodies in Mitigating Natural Catastrophe Risks in China, 
SWISS RE (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.swissre.com/china/Swiss_Re_works_with_government_
bodies_in_mitigating_natural_catastrophe_risks_in_China.html [https://perma.cc/88RV-NLHR]. 
 40 Jiajun Wang, Research on Legislation Pattern of Catastrophe Insurance in Major City of 
China—Based on Study on Pilot Work of Catastrophe Insurance in Shenzhen, 29 J. POSTGRADU-
ATE ZHONGNAN U. ECON. & L. 81, 81–87 (2013) (identifying between 2000 and 2007 the occur-
rence of thirty rainstorms, nine typhoons, ten heatwaves, four hail storms, five drought events, and 
eight freeze events). 
 41 Jasmin Sasin, Shenzhen Ranks Fifth in the World in Terms of Population Density, SHEN-
ZHEN STANDARD (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.shenzhen-standard.com/2014/03/25/shenzhen-
ranks-fifth-in-the-world-in-terms-of-population-density/ [https://perma.cc/F2VH-ZZ2Z]; see Da-
vid Biello, Climate Change Will Be Solved in Cities—Or Not at All, SCI. AM. (Sept. 23, 2014) 
(noting Shenzhen’s population size). See generally He Huifeng & Clifford Lo, Shenzhen Residents 
Slam Authorities After City Paralysed by Floods, S. CHINA MORNING POST (May 13, 2014), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1510882/shenzhen-residents-slam-authorities-after-city-
paralysed-floods [https://perma.cc/UNN5-DL4B] (observing that Shenzhen city has not been ac-
countable on spending to improve drainage and flood control). 
 42 R.J. Nicholls et al., Ranking Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to Climate 
Extremes 27 (Env’t Directorate, Working Paper No. 1, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/official
documents/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ENV/WKP(2007)1&doclanguage=en [https://perma.
cc/8N8J-YVN6]. 
 43 PICC PROP’Y & CASUALTY CO., LTD., CATASTROPHE INSURANCE FRAMEWORK OF SHEN-
ZHEN CITY 4, 7 (2015). 
 44 China Re, Swiss Re, and Taiping Re Underwrite the Shenzhen Catastrophe Reinsurance 
Policies, SINOINS.COM (July 6, 2014), http://xw.sinoins.com/2014-07/16/content_121575.htm 
[https://perma.cc/U7ND-6JBE] (underwriting from multiple reinsurance agencies). 
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medical costs and pension costs due to victims’ injuries or deaths caused by 
the disasters. Payment for a single disaster event is capped at two billion 
yuan with maximum individual claims of 100,000 yuan, approximately 
$15,710 in U.S. dollars.45 The pilot program clearly does not contemplate a 
claim being made by a large number of citizens for any single event; be-
cause coverage for a single disaster event is capped at two billion yuan, the 
program will be able to deliver maximum individual relief to 25,000 indi-
viduals in the event of a disaster.46 
The second tier is a catastrophe fund managed by the City of Shen-
zhen.47 Capital sources of the catastrophe fund include government appro-
priation, social donation, and investment earnings.48 Where catastrophe 
losses exceed the cap of 2.5 billion yuan available in the first tier of insur-
ance, the catastrophe fund should provide extra coverage.49 In addition, the 
City of Shenzhen intends to issue catastrophe insurance linked securities, 
such as catastrophe bonds, and thus transfer catastrophe risk to capital mar-
kets.50 The government-funded policy covering the first and second tiers of 
the insurance framework is limited in scope and covers only fifteen events 
including heavy winds, rainstorms, lightning strikes, floods, waterlogging, 
tornado, typhoons, tsunamis, hail, landslides, mudslides, cliff slides, land 
subsidence, severe thunderstorms, and earthquakes of more than 4.5 magni-
tude.51 The final tier is private catastrophe insurance to cover property loss-
es.52 Because domestic property insurance is a very new product in China, 
this tier of insurance is still being developed. 
II. IS THE SHENZHEN MODEL OF SOCIAL INSURANCE A MODEL FOR 
CLIMATE ADAPTATION FOR MEGACITIES? 
The introduction of social insurance in the context of climate change 
risk management is not a new innovation. For example, the World Bank’s 
Global Index Insurance Facility has been supporting the development of 
index-based disaster insurance for farmers, pastoralists, and micro-
                                                                                                                           
 45 Catastrophe Insurance Framework of Shenzhen City, supra note 43; Martin Li & Yin Ran, 
SZ Launches 1st Disaster Insurance, SHENZHEN DAILY (July 10, 2014), http://szdaily.sznews.
com/html/2014-07/10/content_2936724.htm [https://perma.cc/NHB6-M6HB]. 
 46 See Catastrophe Insurance Framework of Shenzhen City, supra note 43. 
 47 Id.; see Li & Ran, supra note 45 (describing a thirty-million-yuan catastrophe fund). 
 48 See Li & Ran, supra note 45. 
 49 Catastrophe Insurance Framework of Shenzhen City, supra note 43. 
 50 Yisha Hou, Promoting the Construction of Shenzhen Catastrophe Insurance System, 25 
DISASTER REDUCTION IN CHINA 42, 42–45 (2015). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Catastrophe Insurance Framework of Shenzhen City, supra note 43. 
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entrepreneurs for the last five years.53 What is new about the nationally 
funded city-wide model of disaster insurance in Shenzhen is that it is an 
insurance product that has been developed for urban recovery.54 Although 
the Shenzhen model of social insurance is only a pilot at this point, could 
this insurance program represent a new viable model of adaptation to cli-
mate change not just for municipalities in China but also for other states? 
The program has only been in effect for about a year and so there is little 
public data assessing the pilot. Some general observations based on the 
structure of the insurance pilot may be useful in thinking about the role of 
insurance in climate adaptation for cities where there is likely to be large 
aggregation of individual losses in close proximity. 
A. Positive Values of the Shenzhen Social Insurance Model for  
Climate Change Adaptation 
Compared to the absence of any other available insurance, the Shen-
zhen model offers a number of distinct advantages.55 First, the model pro-
vides timely relief for citizens and operates as a safety net particularly for 
the poorest residents who do not have disposable income to cover the costs 
associated with bodily injuries arising from disasters.56 Many of these poor 
individuals may be located in the most disaster-prone areas of the cities and 
are also the most likely to be gravely injured in a disaster.57 There is evi-
dence that micro-insurance products providing even small payments to par-
ties experiencing losses have been important in low-income communities to 
help them financially rebound.58 Even small sums of money, such as that 
offered by the Shenzhen program, that are delivered in a timely fashion may 
make a difference in covering basic medical costs that would allow individ-
uals to return to the workforce more rapidly. The substantial challenge for 
the Shenzhen program operating in a dense urban environment will be to 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See Global Index Insurance Facility, INT’L FIN. CORP., http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/
connect/industry_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/industries/financial+markets/retail+fi-
nance/insurance/global+index+insurance+facility [https://perma.cc/TU7T-XRMW]. 
 54 See China: Shenzhen Launches Its First Disaster Insurance Pilot Scheme, supra note 38. 
55 See infra notes 57–74 and accompanying text. 
 56 See generally Li & Ran, supra note 45 (explaining the program, funded by the government, 
will cover costs relating to medical expenses, disabilities, and death caused by the disaster). 
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determine the optimal means for delivering payments if critical infrastruc-
ture, such as postal services, were to be disrupted by an earthquake or flood. 
Second, the existence of the insurance gives a strong incentive for 
Shenzhen to issue early warnings and to prioritize residents’ safety by creat-
ing and enforcing disaster-oriented municipal codes. Shenzhen is not a pas-
sive player in the insurance scheme but has invested several million yuan 
into issuing insurance.59 These sums are annually paid in order to build up 
financial capital in the fund for disasters that are unavoidable “perfect 
storms.” It is not in the city’s best interest to have its invested sums depleted 
by events where the population could have been warned to evacuate or 
where the population could have been protected by code enforcement ef-
forts. To reduce risk, the Shenzhen model offers risk-based premiums; for 
instance, the model’s thirty-six million yuan annual premium is decided 
based on catastrophe model analysis, actuarial evaluation, and international 
reinsurance prices.60 Risk-based premiums enable insurers to provide a dis-
count to the government for adopting cost-effective mitigation measures.61 
It provides that if the annual loss ratio—actual payment amount/total pre-
mium—is less than 10%, then the premium for the following year will be 
given a 10% discount; if the loss ratio is less than 10% in two consecutive 
years, the third year’s premium will have a 20% discount; if the loss ratio is 
less than 10% in three consecutive years, the fourth year’s premium will 
have a 30% discount.62 Ultimately, the local municipality, in light of both 
the interest of public safety and its own financial interests, has the incentive 
to prioritize the development of a risk-aware culture. 
Offering a third advantage, the Shenzhen model reflects an important 
departure from current national practices of managing disasters by relying 
on centralized management. The Chinese mechanism for adapting to cli-
mate change risks is known as the “Whole-Nation System” (“Juguo tizhi”) 
and is generally activated to deliver disaster emergency relief; when trig-
gered, the government will deploy and allocate key resources from across 
the nation to provide emergency relief.63 While effective in delivering 
emergency relief in the short-run, it is not sustainable in the long-term be-
cause it reduces community incentives to invest in protection and mitigation 
measures, burdens public budgets, and contributes to perverse incentives for 
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rent-seeking and corruption.64 The Shenzhen model offers a broader diversi-
fication of risks by involving both public and private interests, which is im-
portant for ensuring that there are financial resources available to provide 
payments in the case of losses.65 
Another advantage of the Shenzhen model is that it builds on expertise 
from the insurance industry in providing loss prevention services. Histori-
cally, insurers have worked in tandem with experts, insureds, and other 
stakeholders to identify technical and economic parameters associated with 
loss prevention and to develop new insurance products for future loss pre-
vention.66 Under the Shenzhen model, knowledge from the insurance indus-
try’s research will be shared with the municipal government when the catas-
trophe insurers submit an annual report to the government on disaster risk 
management.67 The Shenzhen model is structured to support additional in-
vestments in risk-related research. Five percent of the premium will be used 
to organize disaster research, disaster prevention, disaster emergency relief 
drills, and disaster emergency advertising.68 
A fifth advantage of social insurance is that its products potentially al-
low for the spreading of risk across a large population because social insur-
ance products can be designed to be inclusive. Insurance depends on the 
“law of large numbers.”69 Unlike other insurance schemes, there is no need 
to opt-in to the municipal policy or the catastrophe fund.70 The United 
States has in recent years faced challenges with its National Flood Insurance 
Program because even though the program is mandated for homes that have a 
federal mortgage within areas where hundred-year catastrophic floods are 
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predicted, only about forty-nine percent of homes within these flood zones 
actually have obtained flood insurance.71 Voluntary insurance policies would 
presumably fare even worse. 
Finally, the Shenzhen social insurance pilot offers a degree of predict-
ability about what a population might expect from its government in terms 
of an economic response. The Dutch Government has established an ex post 
facto compensation scheme, but there is apparently limited transparency 
regarding what events will be covered and how much compensation will be 
available.72 By knowing what will be covered under the social insurance 
components of the Shenzhen insurance, citizens can respond and acquire 
additional coverage. For example, the Shenzhen model encourages private 
commercial insurance to cover losses that exceed coverage under the social 
insurance components of the model.73 Some private insurance products are 
currently being sold through private firms to Shenzhen residents.74 
B. Limitations of Shenzhen Social Insurance as a Model for  
Climate Change Adaptation 
In addition to these potential benefits of diversification of risk across a 
large population and predictable and hopefully timely payments to some of 
the most vulnerable individuals in society, the Shenzhen model faces certain 
challenges as an adaptation strategy designed to enhance social resilience. 
Although the Shenzhen model seems promising in terms of providing the 
most basic of coverage for Shenzhen residents, there are a number of issues 
with applying the pilot as the model for future insurance schemes designed 
to enhance climate change adaptation. The primary concern with the current 
social insurance portion of the pilot is that the capitalization of the insur-
ance will not be sufficient to cover the actual bodily damage or losses from 
a major disaster event or the property losses or business interruption losses 
that are necessary for securing long-term social resilience within a commu-
nity. The coverage under the municipal policy is quite limited with a cap of 
100,000 yuan for individual claim payments, and payments are only availa-
ble for bodily damage and death.75 According to an empirical research study 
conducted in 2013 in Shenzhen, more than seventy percent of the residents 
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hoped that the coverage could be extended to 500,000 yuan for individual 
claim payments.76 
The Chinese government expects that property insurance will be of-
fered by a private insurance market, but non-life insurance products such as 
property insurance have been notably absent from Asian markets, in part 
because of high residual risks that arise due to an under-enforcement of 
building codes and land-use planning.77 Loss of business-related property or 
the lack of predictability of operating a business after a disaster may lead 
firms to either relocate or cease operations. These are real possibilities be-
cause very few small or medium sized businesses have planned for the finan-
cial implications of post-disaster recovery.78 For example, in Thailand, the 
2011 floods led to the closure of over 550,000 small and medium sized 
businesses and the loss of 2.3 million jobs.79 The loss of firms, particularly 
those who are large employers, could lead to an outmigration from one 
community to others that are perceived as physically safer for investment.80 
With outmigration, communities may opt not to rebuild assets but instead 
abandon factories and terminate jobs.81 
Offering some form of property coverage as part of social insurance 
will not be as straightforward as offering coverage for bodily injury. The 
challenge will be to assess appropriate risk-based premiums for those types 
of extreme risks that would drive displacement from a community. An addi-
tional challenge for designing any insurance product will be narrowing the 
gap between insured losses and actual losses. Even though catastrophe 
models in the face of incidents driven by climate change are evolving, natu-
ral disasters are still relatively infrequent, so modeling for risk-based pre-
miums reflects a substantial amount of uncertainty.82 Presumably, groups or 
individuals in particularly risky physical situations could be mandated to 
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carry some level of property or business interruption insurance. Mandatory 
coverage might be linked to ordinary financial transactions for a business. 
For example, in the United States, all federally regulated or federally in-
sured mortgage holders who own property in a high-risk area—where there 
is a one in four chance of flooding in thirty years—must have a flood insur-
ance policy.83 This form of “bundled” insurance contributes to a broader 
adoption of insurance than would be seen with a voluntary program.84 
Premiums on any business or property insurance must be kept afforda-
ble for a sufficient number of parties in an area to be impacted. Until there 
are clear profit streams for private providers, the government will likely be 
the primary funder for insurance. For example, in the United States, where 
premiums associated with natural disaster losses have become unaffordable 
for many individuals, many states have established state-run natural disaster 
insurance arrangements.85 
The second concern with the current pilot is that the government catas-
trophe assistance insurance may inadvertently compete with the private in-
surance market in the coverage areas financed by the government. Because 
the Shenzhen municipal government will buy insurance for the residents, 
there is no need for the residents to pay premiums to opt-in to a voluntary 
insurance scheme.86 This arrangement gives the residents incentives not to 
purchase insurance but instead to rely on the government. Curiously, the 
government support of this program appears to run counter to residents’ 
desires. According to an empirical research study conducted in 2013, only 
4% of the residents hope that the government would pay premiums for 
them; 60% of them would prefer to purchase government-subsidized private 
catastrophe insurance.87 These numbers may reflect a lack of trust that gov-
ernment agencies will choose adequate insurance products to cover its citi-
zens. 
A third concern with the current pilot is that it lacks legislative imple-
mentation at the municipal level and is administered through a more ad hoc 
approach. The city of Shenzhen has not enacted catastrophe insurance regu-
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lations or any other corresponding implementing legal framework.88 The 
Shenzhen municipal government may cease to buy catastrophe insurance 
policies without any penalty. Without a specific legislative framework in 
place to ensure accountability for Shenzhen citizens, the long-term prospect 
of this pilot is uncertain. 
A fourth concern related to using insurance as a tool for climate adap-
tation is that the Shenzhen social insurance addresses only a select subset of 
climate change impacts. While historically the coastal city of Shenzhen has 
been faced with flood events, it is also possible that heat waves or outbreaks 
of infectious disease attributed to climate change events could result in city-
wide impacts.89 The current policy seems to be restricted to a certain small-
er set of events.90 While it may make sense to restrict financial exposure of 
the city to additional catastrophic risks, the limited number of events cov-
ered by the insurance constrains the effectiveness of the Shenzhen social 
insurance as an adaptation tool for climate change because the city is likely 
to focus its risk reduction efforts primarily on those climate-related risks 
covered by the insurance product (such as floods), and not on other climate 
related risks (such as heat waves).91 
A fifth concern is that the Shenzhen model may create a situation of 
moral hazard by causing some parties to continue to undertake risky behav-
iors—such as putting workers in dangerous proximity to flood situations or 
building in flood-prone areas—because compensation should be available 
through the insurance scheme. In theory, if the insurance pool covers a suf-
ficient amount of actual losses and the claim process is not too onerous, 
then there may be little social pressure to change “business as usual” prac-
tices.92 Insurance that pays economic compensation without the promise of 
effecting change would fail to function as an effective social adaptation 
mechanism. The issue of a society-wide moral hazard might be productive-
ly addressed by introducing some form of individual deductible that might 
include assigning ineligibility for a benefit if an insured party who is at-
tempting to collect a claim fails to demonstrate some negotiated level of 
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risk reduction for a property or an activity. A blend of private responsibility 
with public responsibility may provide the necessary financial buffer that 
allows the public to cost-effectively underwrite a general insurance product 
like the Shenzhen insurance. 
A final concern about applying the Shenzhen model as a climate 
change measure is that the success of the model depends on the fiscal capa-
bility of the local government. Shenzhen is a relatively affluent municipality 
and it may be difficult to extend the insurance model to other cities that lack 
the public finance resources to start up a similar insurance program. 
C. Urban Social Insurance as Successful Climate Change Adaptation? 
As individual citizens across the globe are experiencing climate 
change in a variety of forms ranging from temperatures that are too hot to 
temperatures that are too cold, the question is whether social insurance like 
the Shenzhen pilot can be considered successful climate change adaptation. In 
2013, climate change researcher Neil Adger and his research team offered 
several potential criteria for measuring the success of adaption, including ef-
fectiveness, efficiency, equity, and legitimacy.93 The Shenzhen pilot can be 
measured by these four criteria. 
 Effectiveness can be measured by determining whether a given pro-
gram achieves its objectives, including reducing impacts, exposures, and 
risk while promoting community security.94 The existing Shenzhen insurance 
pilot is tailored to improve immediate financial security for individuals in 
the aftermath of a disaster, but there is no indication that, as designed, it 
will reduce long-term community exposure to repeat hazards such as flood-
ing. Until the insurance payouts are linked explicitly to ex ante risk reduc-
tion measures, any city offering social disaster insurance will be simply 
handling ex post impacts.95 On the adaptation criteria of effectiveness, the 
Shenzhen model appears to function largely as a short-term recovery tool 
rather than a mechanism to reduce overall community exposure. 
The second criteria of adaptation, economic efficiency, can be evaluat-
ed on the basis of the distribution of costs and benefits.96 On this measure of 
economic efficiency, the Shenzhen insurance is successful because it dis-
burses a pool of limited public funds to private individuals who might, 
without the insurance, possibly require even more extensive public assis-
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tance from national or international actors. Economic efficiency is promoted 
in the social insurance components of the Shenzhen model through caps and 
maximum payments.97 
Regarding the third criteria, equity of outcome, the success of an adap-
tation can be measured by who wins, who loses, and who gets to make the 
decisions regarding the adaptation.98 Whether the Shenzhen model insur-
ance operates equitably remains to be seen, as it depends upon how the sys-
tem responds in distributing payments after a disaster. There may be some 
groups who should receive payments for the injuries that they have in-
curred, such as the elderly and disabled, but may not promptly receive these 
payments due to existing social marginalization. In this way, disaster events 
tend to reinforce pre-existing power imbalances.99 
Finally, the success of an adaptation will depend on whether it is 
deemed a legitimate intervention by decision-makers.100 Because cultural 
expectations will influence whether a specific adaptation is considered to 
carry with it the force of law or social authority, it would be necessary to 
conduct a broad survey of cultural attitudes across different populations.101 
This is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Leaving aside the question of whether the insurance is perceived as le-
gitimate by Shenzhen residents, applying the existing social insurance as an 
adaptation model for climate change appears to offer mixed conclusions. On 
the one hand, the insurance appears to be relatively economically efficient 
and potentially equitable, but on the other hand, the social insurance is of 
questionable effectiveness. Given the initial two billion yuan of investment 
in the municipal insurance component of the pilot, what more might be 
done to cost-effectively alleviate future suffering linked to climate change 
in large municipalities such as Shenzhen? 
III. ADAPTING THE SHENZHEN MODEL FOR SUCCESS 
In theory, insurance can play an important role in climate change adap-
tation by increasing disaster risk reduction efforts and compensating the 
victims of climate change’s impacts.102 Insurance schemes like the national-
ly funded city-wide model of disaster insurance in Shenzhen alone will not 
be enough to enhance national socio-economic resilience—they are simply 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Catastrophe Insurance Framework of Shenzhen City, supra note 43. 
 98 See Adger et al., supra note 93, at 83. 
 99 See id. at 84 (citing post-recovery efforts after Hurricane Mitch as reinforcing pre-disaster 
inequalities). 
 100 See id. 
 101 See id. 
 102 See PRABHAKAR ET AL., supra note 92, at 7. 
502 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:485 
too thin of a response in terms of reducing exposure to hazards. The Shen-
zhen insurance is an ex post facto strategy.103 In conjunction with the deliv-
ery of the insurance, the region will also need a stronger ex ante response to 
reduce the city’s vulnerability to known weather events and perhaps to give 
more attention to pooling risks with other similarly situated centers. 
In March 2015, the global community in the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction, which was adopted at the Third United Nations 
World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, recognized the urgency of 
investing in disaster risk management now to avoid future disaster scenari-
os.104 In particular, the framework emphasizes the need for “enhanced work 
to reduce exposure and vulnerability.”105 While social insurance products 
can address concerns over increasing vulnerability of populations that re-
side in harm’s way, this type of insurance is unlikely to reduce exposure to 
hazards unless it is somehow directly connected to risk reduction efforts. 
Smarter planning regarding future developments or redevelopments and 
subsidized risk reduction for known hazards are needed to adapt the Shen-
zhen model to be a successful adaptation model to incentivize social 
change. 
A. Smarter Planning, Subsidized Risk Reduction, and Penalties for Inertia 
What is needed at this juncture is national—or possibly provincial, in 
the case of federalist governments—climate proofing of various sectors 
across a city. Prevention of disaster avoids future costs associated with dis-
aster response.106 Some of this preventative work can be done cost-
effectively by climate smart planning so that development is not permitted 
in flood plains or new developments are built to more robust code stand-
ards.107 Effective planning will rely on exercising political backbone, particu-
larly on the part of local municipalities where many land use decisions are 
made.108 Central governments may encourage effective planning through 
some combination of incentives or penalties, depending on how cooperative 
a given planning body has been in mainstreaming climate disaster concerns. 
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Many municipalities rely on some central funding, particularly for the de-
velopment and maintenance of larger infrastructure projects.109 
In the more typical case, the existing infrastructure may need to be 
strengthened or enlarged to cope with severe weather events. For example, 
in the case of the chronic flooding faced by Shenzhen, the city must make 
rapid strategic investments into appropriately sized water and wastewater 
infrastructure while also potentially shoring up vulnerable areas such as de-
vegetated coastal zones.110 The city may also need to proactively relocate 
populations that are directly exposed to impacts of natural disasters but who 
are unable to make personal investments in reducing disaster threats, such 
as parties living in temporary squatter settlements. All of these government-
facilitated programs would contribute to long-term climate change adapta-
tion for the municipality as a whole. 
In many instances, individuals, including individual businesses, are un-
likely to voluntarily invest in natural disaster risk mitigation because the 
degree of exposure is perceived as insignificant unless they have experi-
enced a disaster.111 While parties may reassess their perceptions about in-
vesting in mitigation after a certain level of damage is experienced, it may 
be too late to secure long-term community resilience. Injured parties with 
the resources may simply leave the community. This is arguably the story of 
New Orleans, Louisiana, where individuals and business have failed to re-
build in some flood-devastated neighborhoods and have instead relocated to 
Texas and other states.112 If enough such parties depart in succession, then 
the community begins to experience what might be termed “disaster flight.” 
Unless numerous ex ante steps are taken to prevent known hazards 
from becoming the precursors to a disaster, insurance will not be able to 
support long-term socio-economic adaptation because premiums for exist-
ing insurance products may be spread too thin to adequately cover city-wide 
losses. Insurance must be approached as a last resort strategy to allow for 
recovery from unexpected events. For expected events—such as the col-
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lapse of poorly constructed buildings during a storm event or the release of 
untreated waste from containment ponds—national ministries and munici-
palities should facilitate planning efforts to address known vulnerabilities 
by providing subsidies for risk reduction. Insurers and particularly reinsur-
ers with a large database of this type of recurring global losses are well po-
sitioned to provide support on cost effective mitigation measures.113 Subsi-
dies for mitigation should create sufficient incentives to assist with what 
may be difficult physical transitions in communities, such as the changing 
of building materials or the raising of buildings. For entities with limited 
capital, such as low-income homeowners, the costs of making changes 
could be provided through direct government payments. For individuals or 
groups with existing capital, such as established companies, subsidies might 
be provided in the form of graduated tax credits. 
Where incentives are not sufficient to prod parties into “climate-
proofing” assets or relocating assets, penalties may need to be assigned for 
a failure to act. Because certain parts of a city are more likely to experience 
damage than other areas, due to geography or density of infrastructure, the 
timelines for taking action to reduce disaster exposure may vary for differ-
ent areas of a city.114 For example, open wastewater treatment ponds in a 
coastal region or an area near a water channel prone to flooding may need 
to be contained on a shorter deadline than a similar treatment pond on a 
plateau region, before penalties are incurred. Available investment is obvi-
ously limited and public funding should be preferentially given to eliminat-
ing disaster hot spots where private investment is unlikely. 
In the coming years, the international community, based on the com-
mitments voluntarily entered by States during the Sendai Framework dis-
cussions, can expect more systematic disaster risk reduction through the 
support of organizations such as the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction 
and Recovery (the “Facility”) that provides assistance from donor states to 
low and middle income disaster prone states for risk identification, risk re-
duction, risk preparedness, financial protection, and resilient recovery.115 
The Facility provides for ex ante funding covering both national and re-
gional disaster risk reduction.116 Among its recent projects are reports on 
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disaster resilience that underscore the need to invest resources now in 
strengthening urban centers’ responses to future climate impacts.117 
Ex ante disaster risk reduction is a long-term work in progress. Prag-
matically, cities will not be disaster-proofed rapidly, but there must be clear 
government leadership at both national and municipal levels to support in-
frastructure transition and changes in community behavior. For low and 
medium level risks, prevention is more cost-effective than investing in risk 
transfers.118 Equally important to the investments in ex ante risk manage-
ment will be strategies providing for a broader diversification of risks.119 
The next section highlights one such strategy in the form of risk pooling.120 
B. Global Insurance Pools for Mega-cities 
Losses from a catastrophe such as Hurricane Sandy in New York City 
highlight the financial exposure of mega-cities to disasters.121 In addition to 
the bodily injuries, there were substantial property losses and countless 
business interruption losses.122 Recovery from Hurricane Sandy is still on-
going in part because of bottlenecks in the claim adjustment processes.123 A 
social insurance system with pre-contracted payments for a given trigger 
event may have eliminated some of the transactional costs of claims ad-
justment, but underwriting catastrophe insurance for cities—especially 
mega-cities—remains a risky business for an insurance company when in-
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sured assets are in close proximity.124 Success in a mega-city index market 
will depend in part on global diversification of risks across a range of loca-
tions, and also possibly across a range of type of climate impacts.125 For 
example, insurance scholars have recently observed that insurance losses in 
American and Australian-Asian markets are not closely linked, so these in-
surance markets would be better positioned to share risks.126 
Pooling risk through global insurance pools allows for disaster impacts 
to be offset across a wide number of actors.127 For example, harms in one 
mega-city such as Shanghai could be offset by risks in a mega-city such as 
London that is geographically distant from the original harms. Likewise, 
hurricane risks in New York could be offset within a disaster risk pool by 
heat waves in Chengdu. Risk pooling for megacities, particularly in Asia, 
may be especially appropriate for low probability but high damage 
events.128 
A number of existing catastrophe risk pools involving disaster prone 
states might serve as models for diversifying a megacity risk pool. The first 
multi-country risk pool was set up with the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk 
Insurance Facility (“CCRIF”) using financial contributions from Canada, 
the European Union, the United Kingdom, France, Ireland, Bermuda, Japan, 
the World Bank, and the Caribbean Development Bank.129 The sixteen in-
sured countries also pay premiums, which vary according to the costs of 
rebuilding.130 After a trigger event happens, measured on the basis of a 
ground-shaking incident or a wind speed, funds are quickly provided via 
reinsurance and capital markets to support immediate relief following a dis-
aster.131 In the case of a storm that hit several Caribbean countries, fifty 
percent of the designated funds were disbursed seven days after the original 
storm impact and the remainder was distributed fourteen days after the dis-
aster.132 The money went to protect, and where necessary, rebuild, critical 
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infrastructure such as drinking water plants.133 To avoid overcompensation 
and to encourage system wide risk management, governments participating 
in the CCRIF have only been permitted to purchase coverage for $100 mil-
lion for business interruption losses from a single disaster event.134 
A second model is the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance pilot de-
signed by the World Bank in conjunction with the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community, Japan, the Asian Development Bank, and the Global Facility 
for Disaster Reduction and Recovery to assist the Marshall Islands, Tonga, 
Solomon Islands, Samoa, and Vanuatu with post-disaster recovery from 
earthquake events, including tsunamis and tropical cyclones.135 The idea is 
that by pooling risk across the geographical region, the states will be able to 
recover more quickly after a disaster.136 Two payments have been made un-
der the program since its inception with $1.9 million going to Vanuatu after 
Category 5 Cyclone Pam and a payout to Tonga for Cyclone Ian.137 
Each of these models offers a means for pooling risk across a group of 
actors who are similarly exposed to certain types of risks and ensures a 
quick infusion of cash into an economy to address business interruption and 
losses in key property assets.138 In conjunction with risk reducing efforts, 
states at the national level, in the case of large states such as China, or at the 
regional level, for smaller states such as Singapore, should explore broader 
pooling of city-based risks that can be attributed to climate change to in-
crease the reservoir of capital available for disaster responses. Although 
models such as the Caribbean and Pacific catastrophe pools may not be eas-
ily replicated without the support of international insurers, cities of a certain 
size with similar risk profiles should consider pooling certain types of 
risks.139 For example, thirteen of the twenty most populated cities in the 
world are port cities that might benefit from sharing risks associated with 
damage to port infrastructure and port economies.140 
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A successful mega-city pooling of disaster risk would need access to 
cross-border reinsurance, which has been restricted in some jurisdictions.141 
A mega-city pool should also incentivize disaster risk reduction by adjust-
ing premiums to reflect disaster-proofing efforts on the part of a given ju-
risdiction. In a pool of similarly situated municipalities such as high popula-
tion port cities, the various city participants may find common cause in 
promoting best practices and have the expertise to assist each other in im-
plementing these practices. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern disasters are testing our adaptability as a species. We know 
with a great degree of certainty each year that climatic conditions are 
changing and that more and more individuals and companies are facing ex-
posure to potentially catastrophic events. The pilot insurance program in 
Shenzhen, China, the first large scale social insurance product, is to be ap-
plauded as a bold social effort to assist community recovery—particularly 
for some of the poorest members of the community—in the face of climate 
change. While this insurance appears to be an efficient and equitable market 
tool for providing relief for bodily injuries and deaths, there are legitimate 
questions about whether it will be effective in stimulating the kind of long-
term post-disaster recovery that will promote community resilience. This 
Article concludes by suggesting that states must understand insurance as a 
last resort adaptation strategy. Before insurance can become effective as an 
adaptation product for mega-cities, these cities, with the support of govern-
ment subsidies, must begin the long and politically difficult process of 
“climate-proofing” through a variety of city-specific programs offering in-
centives to act and assigning penalties for a failure to act. To the extent that 
cities choose to continue to offer insurance products for residents, these cit-
ies should consider pooling their risk. 
In the past century, governing bodies at the local, regional, and nation-
al levels have gambled with the outcome of climate change. Numerous 
global leaders have misunderstood the odds associated with change and 
have countenanced a great deal of hazardous economic choices that contin-
ue to expose millions of individuals across the globe to new risks. It is time 
for the same governance bodies to improve the survivability odds for these 
individuals and for generations to come. Insurance is part of a long-term 
adaptation strategy to soften financial shocks associated with physical dev-
astation, but much work still remains to be done to eliminate known disaster 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See SCHANZ & WANG, supra note 31, at 44. 
2016] Is the Shenzhen Social Insurance Program a Model for Adaptation? 509 
risk before we can assume, as the insurance industry informs us, that we “are 
in good hands.” 
  
 
 
